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Question Bank
Question
Can an application for alteration, modification or revocation filed under Section 25(2) relate to any period prior to the order being passed?
Solution
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005; Section 12, 25– Any alteration, modification or revocation of an order passed under Section 12 of the Act owing to a change in circumstances could only be for a period ex post facto, i.e., post the period of an order being made in a petition under Section 12 of the Act and not to a period prior thereto. Thus, such an application for alteration, modification or revocation filed under sub-section (2) of Section 25 of the Act cannot relate to any period prior to the order being passed, inter alia, under Section 12 of the Act (Para 17) – for the invocation of Section 25(2) of the Act, there must be a change in the circumstances after the order being passed under the Act- Thus, an order for alteration, modification or revocation operates prospectively and not retrospectively. Though the order for grant of a maintenance is effective retrospectively from the date of the application or as ordered by the Magistrate, the position is different with regard to an application for alteration in an allowance, which may incidentally be either an increase or a reduction – to take effect from a date on which the order of alteration is made or any other date such as from the date on which an application for alteration, modification or revocation was made depending on the facts of each case. (Para 14) S Vijikumari vs. Mowneshwarachari C 2024 INSC 732
Question
What is the scope of expression ‘change in circumstances’ under Section 25(2)?
Solution
Change in the Circumstances -the Magistrate has to adjudge the change in the circumstances based on the material put forth by the parties in a case and having regard to the circumstances of the said case. A change in the circumstances under the Act may be of either a pecuniary nature, such as a change in the income of the respondent or an aggrieved person or it could be a change in other circumstances of the party paying or receiving the allowance, which would justify an increase or decrease of the maintenance amount ordered by the Magistrate to pay or any other necessary change in the relief granted by the Magistrate including a revocation of the earlier order. The phrasing of the provision is wide enough to cover factors like the cost of living, income of the parties, etc. Further, a change in the circumstances need not just be of the respondent but also of the aggrieved person. For example, a change in the financial circumstances of the husband may be a vital criterion for alteration of maintenance but may also include other circumstantial changes in the husband or wife’s life which may have taken place since the time maintenance was first ordered. (Para 12-13) S Vijikumari vs. Mowneshwarachari C 2024 INSC 732
Question
What safeguards should courts adopt to prevent misuse of domestic violence laws while ensuring genuine victims are protected?
Solution
Courts must balance stringent scrutiny of allegations with sensitivity toward genuine victims by:
Prima Facie Evaluation: Apply the Bhajan Lal (1992 Supp (1) SCC 335) guidelines to quash proceedings if allegations lack specificity or are inherently improbable.
Role-Specific Evidence: Require clear attribution of acts to each accused, as held in Geeta Mehrotra v. State of UP (2012) 10 SCC 741, where siblings were absolved due to absence of specific allegations.
Independent Corroboration: Direct evidence (e.g., medical reports, eyewitness accounts) should support claims of physical/mental abuse (Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma, (2013) 15 SCC 755).
Proportionality: Differentiate between passive family members and active perpetrators (Rajesh Sharma v. State of UP, (2017) 6 SCC 242 mandated family welfare committees to filter frivolous cases).
Case Laws Cited:
Geeta Mehrotra: Quashed proceedings against relatives with no direct role.
Indra Sarma: Defined "domestic relationship" under DV Act to exclude distant relatives.
Rajesh Sharma: Introduced procedural safeguards to curb misuse of Section 498A.
Question
What safeguards must courts adopt to balance the rights of aggrieved women under the DV Act, 2005, and prevent misuse against distant relatives (e.g., brothers-in-law) with vague allegations?
Solution
Courts must ensure specificity and proportionality while adjudicating DV Act cases:
Role-Specific Allegations: Distant relatives (like brothers-in-law) cannot be implicated without specific acts of instigation or participation in domestic violence (Geeta Mehrotra v. State of UP, 2012).
Scrutiny of Evidence: Generalized claims (e.g., "pressured to support husband") are insufficient. Corroborative evidence (e.g., texts, witness statements) is essential (Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma, 2013).
Procedural Safeguards:
Early Hearing: Magistrates must adhere to Section 12(4)’s 3-day hearing rule to prevent prolonged harassment.
Appeal Mechanism: Respondents can challenge orders under Section 29 DV Act (appeal to Sessions Court) before approaching the High Court.
Case Laws Cited:
Geeta Mehrotra (2012): Quashed proceedings against siblings due to lack of specific allegations.
Indra Sarma (2013): Defined "domestic relationship" narrowly to exclude passive relatives.
Rajesh Sharma v. State of UP (2017): Recommended family welfare committees to filter frivolous cases
Question
Can proceedings initiated under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act (DV Act), 2005, be quashed by the High Court under Section 482 of the CrPC (or Section 528 of the BNSS, 2023), given their predominantly civil nature?
Solution
Yes, the High Court can exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC/Section 528 BNSS to quash DV Act proceedings, but only in exceptional cases of gross illegality or abuse of process. The Supreme Court in Saurabh Kumar Tripathi clarified:
Jurisdictional Basis: While DV Act proceedings are civil in nature (Kunapareddy v. Swarna Kumari, 2016), they are adjudicated by Criminal Courts (Judicial Magistrates). Thus, Section 482 CrPC applies (Prabha Tyagi v. Kamlesh Devi, 2022).
Limited Interference: Quashing is permissible only if the application under Section 12(1) is patently frivolous, vexatious, or lacks specific allegations (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 guidelines).
Caution Advised: High Courts must adopt a restrained approach to avoid undermining the DV Act’s welfare objectives.
Case Laws Cited:
Kunapareddy v. Swarna Kumari (2016): DV Act proceedings are civil but governed by CrPC.
Prabha Tyagi v. Kamlesh Devi (2022): Emphasized the DV Act’s civil remedies despite penal consequences for breaches.
Bhajan Lal (1992): Laid down tests for quashing proceedings to prevent abuse of process.
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